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Abstract— Software Defined Networking has unfolded a new
area of opportunity in distributed networking and intelligent
networks. There has been a great interest in performing ma-
chine learning in distributed setting, exploiting the abstraction
of SDN which makes it easier to write complex ML queries
on standard control plane. However, most of the research has
been made towards specialized problems (security, performance
improvement, middlebox management etc) and not towards a
generic framework. Also, existing tools and software require
specialized knowledge of the algorithm/network to operate
or monitor these systems. We built a generic toolkit which
abstracts out the underlying structure, algorithms and other
intricacies and gives an intuitive way for a common user
to create and deploy distributed machine learning network
applications. Decisions are made at local level by the switches
and communicated to other switches to improve upon these
decisions. Finally, a global decision is taken by controller based
on another algorithm (in our case voting). We demonstrate
efficacy of the framework through a simple DDoS detection
algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software Defined Networking has been proven to be a
great tool for network management due to (i) decoupling
of network hardware from software, (ii) centralized control
over switches and middleboxes, (iii) network function virtu-
alization, and (iv) traffic engineering. SDN has reduced the
operating costs incurred by service providers while providing
better control over traditional services and flexibility to add
new services.
Recently, there has been increased interest in academic
and research communities in developing intelligent networks
using distributed machine learning over the simple network
elements. The idea is similar to Active Networks in concept
but takes an SDN approach.
Most of the work so far has been problem specific (secu-
rity, performance improvement, middlebox management etc)
and no generic framework exists that can be used for all
of them simultaneously. These tools require domain specific
knowledge to be operated and analysed. In this paper, we
present an idea to perform Machine Learning in distributed
setting through a simple declarative programming model.
We extend RapidNet, an existing rapid networking protocol
simulator, with distributed machine learning capabilities so
that network researchers can write complex Machine Learn-
ing queries over a network in a decoupled fashion through
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Fig. 1. Message flow among RapidLearn components
the control plane abstraction. We also show how local and
global decisions can be made at different levels of network.
These local and global decision algorithms can, further, be
customized by the user as per his use giving him full control
over the network. The toolkit abstracts out the underlying
structure, algorithms and other intricacies providing an in-
tuitive platform for a user to create and deploy distributed
Machine Learning network applications. Decisions made at
local level by the switches can be communicated to other
switches to reinforce these beliefs and, to finally, reach a
global decision.We demonstrate efficacy of the framework
through a simple DDoS detection algorithm working on a
two SDN networks topology.
Our aim is to present a proof-of-concept framework and
demonstrate effectiveness of the toolkit in reducing effort,
time and enhancing performance, scale. Benchmarking ac-
curacy, precision and recall of machine learning algorithms
is not the aim. These algorithms are declared by the end user
as per his requirements.
In later sections, we browse through some of the existing
work in this area, discuss methodology used for the frame-
work, individual project components and design decisions
and some tests and evaluation results.
II. PROJECT COMPONENTS
We defined end-to-end network topology in RapidNet us-
ing declarative NDLog program. A typical NDLog program
specifies the rules to be executed at a network component
and messages that needs to be passed to other components.
We enable network switches to perform machine learning
through a low-latency neighbor element called ”Monitor”. A
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
04
58
6v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 9 
Se
p 2
02
0
Fig. 2. Type of hosts (i) Attackers(red) and (ii) victim (purple)
monitor is a typical top of the rack VM that can execute any
program. These monitors communicate within themselves
and with the centralized controller to perform Distributed
and hierarchical learning among switches and controller.
A. Host
A host is an end user machine connected to the network. In
our usecase, a host would typically be a server, a legitimate
client user or a malicious attacker. A host can send packets to
the network and it can also receive packets from the network.
/*Host program*/
/*Packet initialization*/
rh1 packet(@Switch, Host, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
initPacket(@Host, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac),
link(@Host, Switch, OutPort).
/*Receive a packet*/
rh2 recvPacket(@Host, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
packet(@Host, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac),
link(@Host, Switch, InPort).
B. Switch
A switch is the basic component for our network topology.
It has a MAC-learning capability. It is connected to an
OpenFlow controller. When a switch receives a packet it
looks into its forwarding table for next hop. On a hit, it
forwards the packet on the appropriate port. However, on a
miss, it forwards the packet to the controller and waits for
the controller to make a decision and set appropriate entry
into switch’s forwarding table. We add one more component
in this simple flow - a monitor. A monitor is a top-of-the-
rack VM that connects to the switch with very low latency,
and can handle compute heavy tasks. The switch mirrors all
its incoming traffic to the associated monitor.
/*Switch program*/
/*Query the controller when receiving
unknown packets */
rs1 matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac,
InPort, TopPriority) :-
packet(@Switch, Nei, SrcMac, DstMac),
link(@Switch, Nei, InPort),
maxPriority(@Switch, TopPriority),
blockedLinks(@Switch, Nei, Port),
Port != InPort.
/*Recursively matching flow entries*/
rs2 matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac,
InPort, NextPriority) :-
matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac,
InPort, Priority),
flowEntry(@Switch, MacAdd, OutPort,
Priority),
Priority > 0,
DstMac != MacAdd,
NextPriority := Priority - 1.
/*A hit in flow table, forward the packet
accordingly*/
rs3 packet(@OutNei, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac)
:-
matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac,
InPort, Priority),
flowEntry(@Switch, MacAdd, OutPort,
Priority),
link(@Switch, OutNei, OutPort),
Priority > 0,
DstMac == MacAdd.
/*If no flow matches, send the packet to the
controller*/
rs4 ofPacket(@Controller, Switch, InPort,
SrcMac, DstMac) :-
ofconn(@Switch, Controller),
matchingPacket(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac,
InPort, Priority),
Priority == 0.
/*Insert a flow entry into forwarding table*/
rs5 flowEntry(@Switch, DstMac, OutPort,
Priority) :-
flowMod(@Switch, DstMac, OutPort),
ofconn(@Switch, Controller),
maxPriority(@Switch, TopPriority),
Priority := TopPriority + 1.
/* Set Max Priority */
rs6 maxPriority(@Switch, Priority) :-
flowEntry(@Switch, DstMac, OutPort,
Priority).
/*Following the controller’s instruction,
send out the packet as broadcast*/
rs7 packet(@OutNei, Switch, SrcMac, DstMac)
:-
broadcast(@Switch, InPort, SrcMac, DstMac),
link(@Switch, OutNei, OutPort),
OutPort != InPort.
/*Send every incoming packet to the monitor*/
rs8 monPacket(@Monitor, Controller, Switch,
SrcMac, DstMac) :-
monconn(@Switch, Monitor),
ofconn(@Switch, Controller),
packet(@Switch, Nei, SrcMac, DstMac).
/* If Controller sends block then call
blockHost */
rs9 blockedLinks(@Switch, Nei, InPort) :-
block(@Switch, Nei, SrcMac, DstMac),
link(@Switch, Nei, InPort),
ofconn(@Switch, Controller).
Fig. 3. A typical switch in RapidLearn
Fig. 4. Multi-monitor collaboration for iterative decisions
C. Monitor
As mentioned above, the monitor connects to the switch
with very low latency, and can handle compute heavy tasks.
Monitor receives a continuous stream of packets from its
associated switch. The monitor splits the packets into session
streams from different users so that an attacker can be
differentiated from a legitimate user. It then apply Machine
Learning model to detect on each ongoing session to detect
any anomaly. We use Support Vector Classifier (C-SVC) at
the monitor for anomaly detection. Once SVC detects an
ongoing attack from one or more of the users the monitor can
take two actions - (i) directly send its belief to the controller,
or (ii) message other monitors to enhance its belief. All Mon-
itors send their local decisions to the controller. Independent
of these two actions a monitor can also choose to rate-limit
the link with attackers traffic until a global decision is made
by the controller.
/*Monitor program*/
/*If attack is happening. Tell the
controller about Switch, SrcMac and
DstMac*/
/*update this to send the status to other
monitors*/
rm1 ddos_yes(@Controller, Switch, SrcMac,
DstMac) :-
monPacket(@Monitor, Controller,
Switch, SrcMac, DstMac).
ddos_check(Switch, SrcMac, DstMac) ==
1.
D. Controller
We use a simple Openflow controller that makes forward-
ing decisions and modifies switch’s forwarding table. Apart
from this general behavior, switch also listens from several
monitors about possible ongoing attacks and make global
Fig. 5. A simple two network topology for DDOS detection and mitigation
decisions to block an attacker. We emulated the Controller
capability in RapidNet through a sequence of rules.
/*Controller program*/
/*Install rules on switch*/
rc1 flowMod(@Switch, SrcMac, InPort) :-
ofconn(@Controller, Switch),
ofPacket(@Controller, Switch, InPort,
SrcMac, DstMac).
/*Instruct the switch to send out the
unmatching packet*/
rc2 broadcast(@Switch, InPort, SrcMac,
DstMac) :-
ofconn(@Controller, Switch),
ofPacket(@Controller, Switch, InPort,
SrcMac, DstMac).
/*If monitor indicates an ongoing attack
then block it*/
rc3 block(@Switch, SrcMac, DstMac) :-
ddos_yes(@Controller, Switch, SrcMac,
DstMac).
III. METHODOLOGY
We used RapidNet to emulate a simple 2-network SDN
Switch-Controller topology as shown in fig1. Each network
consists of multiple end hosts connected to SDN enabled
switches. These switches further connect to more switches
in a hierarchical arrangement. It is to emulate a typical multi-
level switch arrangement in real networks.
We assume that each switch has MAC-learning capabil-
ity. Every switch with a particular network (administrative
domain) has a known controller to which it sends packets
at the beginning of the flow to make flow decisions. These
controllers will eventually obey openFlow messages to and
fro the switches. Controllers make high level decisions
whether to block a flow, allow it on a particular port or
broadcast it.
We then introduce, Monitors as an active component of
the network that would do most of the heavy-lifting by
executing Machine Learning classifier to detect potential
DDOS attacks. Monitors are expected to be collocated with
the switch resulting into a very low-latency communication.
This allows monitor to run a VM that can run any kind of
machine learning algorithm. In our illustrative use-case, we
run Support Vector Classifier (C-SVC) on the monitor but it
can be customized to run any learning algorithm suitable for
the problem at hand. This provides a great flexibility to the
Fig. 6. RapidLearn calls python script to execute SVC
protocol developer or researcher.
These monitors make decisions in two disjoint phases.
In first phase, they keep monitoring the mirrored packet
stream from the switch. This stream is partitioned into
multiple slices. Every slice corresponds to an active but
distinct user session. Slicing the packets stream is required
to separate legitimate users from malicious users. Whenever
an anomalous activity is monitored from one of the hosts
that host can be blocked without affecting all other hosts
communicating with the same switch. This phase is called
Local Decision.
In second phase, the monitors can either directly send
their beliefs to the controller or iteratively enhance their
beliefs by collaborating with each other. The controller,
finally, receives beliefs from all the monitors and makes final
decision. Controller can use ensemble learning or just deploy
a simple voting mechanism at the end. We followed latter
approach where each monitor sends its belief to the controller
and controller blocks a host based on majority decision. This
phase is called Global Decision.
We wrote a python script that runs C-SVC over the packet
stream on a monitor. This script is called by a user defined
function in rapidNet.
IV. AUTONOMIC LEARNING
A. Dataset
We used Caida dataset to train our learning algo-
rithm. Caida dataset contains approximately one hour of
anonymized traffic traces that include the attack traffic on
the victims and the response from the victims on August 4,
2007. The total size of the original dataset is 21 gigabytes.
The type of the file is the packet capture file. Since there are
few applications to read these data, we exported all the data
to comma-separated value files for easy data reading in any
programming language and machine.
The size of the dataset that we obtained is big and
analyzing all data takes very long time. So, to analyze the
dataset efficiently and quickly, we extracted some features
including source IP address, destination IP address, time
interval in seconds between packets, and packet size in bytes
from the dataset. We analyzed the total number of packets
that were sent from the attacker and victim, the mean time
intervals in seconds, and mean packet size in bytes for each
packet.
Fig. 7. Machine Learning flow in RapidLearn
B. Training
We trained and tested three types of dataset using C-
SVC with the RBF (Gaussian) kernel. The precision for
each dataset is 0.98. These numbers mean that the detection
system could successfully predict the attack. These results
show that the detection accuracy is high when the system
should be alerted. However, the recall is 0.99. These results
show that the system predicted some normal data as the
attack data.
V. EVALUATION
A. Testing
1) Validation of the network containing switches and end
hosts: The designed topology was tested for connectivity
between switches and end hosts via ping packets being
transferred from one end host to another.
2) Valid packet/data capture for the training dataset:
DARPA dataset was used for training and testing purposes.
3) Testing as to whether the rules are being installed
correctly via NDLog: NDLog rules were applied on switches
and were tested accordingly for installation and uninstalla-
tions of rules on switches
4) Reliable message passing between switches and con-
troller: Message passing between switches were made reli-
able and idempotent.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed one approach using machine
learning to develop an DDoS attack detection system. We
analyzed a large number of network communication packets,
and implemented a DDoS attack detection system using the
patterns of DDoS attacks for each IP address. We presented
and discussed the difficulties involved in developing a DDoS
attack detection system using packets and features of DDoS
attacks that are important to detect an attack. These features
are very helpful in developing a detection system for DDoS
attacks. Analyzing the packets, we calculated bytes per sec-
ond with the time sequence and found that there are mainly
two periods in DDoS attack.We also demonstrated a POC
framework which leverages Software Defined Networking
paradigm to execute Distributed Machine Learning algorithm
over a real network. User doesn’t need any domain specific
knowledge can can quickly create test topologies and deploy
his experimental protocols. He can utilise beliefs at various
levels to finally reach global decisions. We demonstrated
an example use-case of two network DDoS detection pro-
tocol and showed how it hugely reduces time, effort and
specialized knowledge while improving scale, performance
and reliability.
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